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An Empirical Test of A Subjective-Expected Utility Explanation
The substantial aim of this paper is to integrate the main idea of ’Pygmalion’ or
self-ful￿lling prophecy research (Rosenthal and Jacobson, 1968; Jussim and Har-
ber, 2005) into the general subjective expected utility framework about inequality
in educational opportunities (Breen and Goldthorpe, 1997; Esser, 1999). In the
theoretical section, a formal model of the impact of self-ful￿lling prophecies on
educational transitions is developed. In the empirical section, we test this model
to predict both students’ educational success (in terms of high school graduation)
and their university transitions. Since we assume a conditional dependence of these
outcomes, we control for sample selection bias (Heckman, 1979). We ￿nd that in
our operationalization of self-ful￿lling prophecies the latter show signi￿cant e￿ects
on both educational success and university transitions. However, while the results
remain stable in case of educational success, we ￿nd that the conditional decision
problem of university transitions leads to a selection bias for the estimates in the
latter case. In a sensitivity analysis we ￿nd that only if unobserved heterogene-
ity would be disturbingly high, it could also a￿ect the stability of self-ful￿lling
prophecy estimates.
1 Introduction
School surely is the ￿rst and by that way also the most important direction point in
everybody’s life course. Following Schelsky (1957), it is crucial ￿for everybody’s future
social security, future social position and the amount of future consumption possibil-
ities￿ (Schelsky, 1957, 18). The economic literature provides numerous examples for
the relationship between schooling and labor market income (e.g. Boissiere et al., 1985;
Ashenfelter et al., 1999). Moreover, there is even evidence that in the long run human
capital ￿ measured by labor-force quality ￿ may in￿uence nations’ productivity and
economic growth (Bishop, 1989; Hanushek and Kimko, 2000). However, although the
importance of schooling and its quality is undisputed, theories in social science about
social inequality in educational opportunities (IEO) still need to be re￿ned.
On the one hand, the theoretical framework that has been provided by social inequal-
ity theory based on rational-choice or subjective expected utility (SEU) assumptions
surely is powerful. One main strength is that it allows us to distinguish between pri-
mary and secondary e￿ects of social inequality, i.e. the di￿erence between e￿ects of
socialization and e￿ects of aspirations. Furthermore, SEU theory always implies the
1formalization of the researcher’s assumptions which facilitates both the comparison of
di￿erent hypotheses and their operationalization into empirical models.
On the other hand, social psychologists have impressively revealed how teachers’ ex-
pectations can in￿uence students’ future performance beyond their (or their parents’)
mere cost-bene￿t considerations. This phenomenon has been labeled the ’Pygmalion
e￿ect’ of self-ful￿lling under-estimations and the ’Golem e￿ect’ of self-ful￿lling over-
estimations; (Rosenthal and Jacobson, 1968). Moreover, Pygmalion research showed
that the variance of this e￿ect can partially be explained by social background variables
(Jussim and Harber, 2005).
The substantial aim of this paper is to integrate the main idea of ’Pygmalion’ into
the general subjective expected utility framework about IEO. In particular, we will refer
to Esser’s (1999) extension of the formal IEO model that has been suggested by Breen
and Goldthorpe (1997). Furthermore, while many ￿ not all ￿ applications of this model
have considered educational transition decisions from primary to secondary school, in
this study we will focus on students’ probability of achieving a high school degree and
on their propensity of beginning academic studies, respectively. The research design
will be an extension of Becker’s (2003) model which includes controls for selection bias
(Heckman, 1979). Additionally, we will perform a sensitivity analysis for all self-ful￿lling
prophecy indicators to test their robustness against a vector of unobserved covariates
(Buis, 2007, 2010).
This paper will be structured as follows: First, the basic assumptions of both the SEU-
IEO model and ’Pygmalion’ will be discussed. Then we will outline how the implications
of the latter require to rebuild the present SEU-IEO model in order to specify the
endogeneity of students’ subjective expected probability of educational success more
adequately. After a short description of the dataset and the variables, a series of stepwise
logit models both without and with controls for selection bias will be presented and
discussed. These models are amended by the sensitivity analyses for the self-ful￿lling
prophecy indicators. The paper ends with a conclusion and provides an outlook on
potential extensions of the model.
2 Theory and Hypotheses
2.1 Inequality of Educational Opportunities: The
Subjected-Expected-Utility Model
One important theoretical concept in the IEO framework is about the di￿erentiation be-
tween primary and secondary e￿ects of social inequality (Boudon, 1974). While primary
e￿ects capture the relationship between social background variables and pupils’ academic
ability (however the latter will be measured), secondary e￿ects of social inequality are
de￿ned either as conditions of schools’ structure or organization ￿ but mainly as the
lower educational aspirations of the students themselves or of their parents (M￿ller-
Benedict, 2007). The argument is that secondary e￿ects of social inequality are still
present after having controlled for all primary e￿ects, i.e. given an intelligence score of a
2certain level, "working class" children will still have lower school achievements because
of lower educational aspirations. But why?
Given education as an investment good (Goldthorpe, 1996, p. 494), the chief concern
for each family will be to achieve some kind of intergenerational stability of class po-
sitions. Hence, service-class parents will be more likely than others to encourage their
children to attain higher education of some kind. Reversely, for families in less advan-
taged positions not only less ambitious and less costly educational options would be
adequate for the goal of maintaining class stability ￿ but also each failed attempt in
obtaining higher educational levels is likely to be more serious in its consequences (e.g.
in terms of further opportunity costs which have to be shouldered). The main advantage
of regarding education as an investment good can be seen in the possibility of applying
rational-choice (RC) or subjective expected utility (SEU) functions.
The Breen-Goldthorpe Model Breen and Goldthorpe (1997) provided a formal model
in order to account for class di￿erences in educational transitions (see Figure 1a). Let
c denote the costs of remaining at school (in terms of both direct costs of educations
and earnings forgone),  the subjective likelihood of success if a student continues in
education, and P, F and L the value or utility that children or their parents attach to
three di￿erent academic outcomes. Service-class, working-class and underclass children
are denoted by S, W, and U, respectively. According to the two (preliminary)
assumptions that i) students’ ability is equally distributed among social classes and ii)
continuing in education is cost-less, the probabilities of service-class children to remain
in service class conditional on the chosen school track are given by
pis =
i + (1   i)1
i + (1   i)1 + 1
(1)
￿ while the corresponding probability of working-class children is given by
piw =
i + (1   i)(1 + 2)
i + (1   i)(1 + 2) + (1 + 2)
: (2)
After a series of linear transformations, Breen and Goldthorpe (1997) can show that
pis > piw for any value of  less than one (p. 284) ￿ meaning that children from middle-
class (i.e. from service and working class) will be more willing to continue a high level
of education than to leave.
Now the authors impose two constraints: i) di￿erences in both ability ai and expec-
tations of success i, and ii) di￿erences in resources. With regard to i), following the
assumption of primary e￿ects of social inequality, the mean level of ability is higher in
service class than in working class. If students’ knowledge about their ability can be sup-
posed to have a positive impact on their subjective probability assessments ( i = g(ai)),
the average expectations of success  will be higher among service-class students (Breen
and Goldthorpe, 1997, p. 285f.).
With regard to ii), if education can only be continued if the available resources ri of
each family exceed the costs of education c; and if service-class families dispose of greater
3(a) Single decision tree. (b) Multiple decision tree
Figure 1: Single vs. multiple decision tree. Source: (Breen and Goldthorpe, 1997, p.
280, 288).
resources than working-class families, the share of students for which the condition ri > c
holds is higher among service-class families than among working-class families.
However, (Breen and Goldthorpe, 1997) stress that the the theoretical model that is
sketched by the single decision tree is a far too simplifying assumption. Empirically, a
multiple decision tree would be the more adequate representation. Here, each decision
about whether or not to continue onto educational level n may be made in the light of
possible entry to educational level n + 1 (e.g. entry to university).
The multiple decision tree in ￿gure 1 b pictures this situation for the case of two tran-
sition choices. Now there are ￿ve possible educational outcomes: immediately leaving
from the lower level (L1), staying at the lower level but failing the examination ( F1),
the corresponding outcomes at the higher level ( L2 and F2), and passing the higher-
level examination (P2). Notably, the higher-level outcomes are only open to those who
pass the examination at the end of the lower level. Thus, both the likelihood-of-success
assumptions and the utility assessments are conditional on the fact that there was no
former dropout.1
1While Breen and Goldthorpe (1997) stress the ￿forward dependency￿ of transition decisions in the light
of subsequent transition decisions, it shall be noted that the multiple decision tree also implies a kind
of ’backward’ dependency ￿ meaning that each further transition is conditional on the antecedent
transition decision(s) (also see Breen and Jonsson, 2000).
4Esser’s’ Extension of the Breen-Goldthorpe Model Esser (1999) uses a SEU model
to explain the mechanisms of parental educational choices at the end of primary school
education. The expected utility EU for the alternatives at hand, to continue onto lower
secondary school (An) or to continue onto intermediate or upper secondary school tracks
(Ab) will be as follows:
EU(An) = Psd( SD) (3)
EU(Ab) = PepB + (1   Pep)Psd( SD)   C (4)
with SD as the expected amount of status decline and with Psd as its impact on parental
decisions; B as the bene￿t of higher education (e.g. in terms of labour market prospects);
Pep as the subjective probability of successfully completing the chosen school track; and
C being the expected costs of education (also see Becker, 2003; Pietsch and Stubbe,
2007). Esser (1999) can show that EU(Ab) > EU(An) if B +PsdSD > C=Pep, while the
term B + PsdSD can be denoted as the educational motivation and the term C=Pep as
the investment risk. Thus, a higher level of education will be aspired if the educational
motivation to continue somehow exceeds the underlying investment risk.
Both the Breen-Goldthorpe- and the Esser model have been tested variously (Jonsson,
1999; Breen and Jonsson, 2000; Becker, 2003; StockØ, 2007; Schneider, 2008). However,
as regards methods, Becker’s (2003) operationalization controlling for selection bias via
￿Heckit￿ correction (Heckman, 1979) ￿(...) provides, at present, the best available test of
the B[reen-]G[oldthorpe]-model￿ (StockØ, 2007, 508). In this model, ￿rst the impact of
parental social class on each of the indicators B,  SD, psd, pep and C is used to correct
for sample selection bias in their explanation of the choice of upper secondary school.
Second, these e￿ects are again used to control for selection bias in the explanation of
the transition to particular school tracks (see section 3.4 for a more formal description
of the Heckit correction).
Becker (2003) justi￿es his three-step method by the endogeneity of the causal struc-
ture. However, the next subsection will provide arguments that there is another endo-
geneity that has been neglected yet but is worthwhile to consider: the impact of teachers’
expectations on the students’ probability of successfully completing the chosen school
track, pep.
2.2 Pygmalion in the Classroom
The idea of a self-ful￿lling prophecy was ￿rstly established by Robert Merton (1948).
In this nowadays classical paper he showed how prejudices towards out-groups (e.g.
African Americans) or speci￿c attitudes about a certain situation (e.g. the rumor of a
bank’s illiquidity) might become true simply as a consequence of the former judgments:
"The prophecy of collapse led to its own ful￿llment" (Merton, 1948, p. 195). Following
the well-known study of Rosenthal and Jacobson (1968), the e￿ect of misled teacher
expectations on student’s future school achievement has been labeled as the ’Pygmalion
E￿ect’.2 The idea behind the metaphor is that too high or too low teacher expectations
2According to the Greek myth as it is narrated by Ovid (Metamorphoses, X), the Cypriot sculptor
Pygmalion carved a woman out of ivory. This statue was so beautiful that he fell in love with it.
5will have an impact on teacher-student interactions, which, in turn, might in￿uence
the students to adopt their motivations and aspirations according to their teachers’
expectations. In the words of Merton, originally misled teacher expectations will have
led to their own ful￿llment.
The classical Pygmalion In the original study, Rosenthal and Jacobson (1968) admin-
istered a nonverbal intelligence test to elementary school children. However, they did not
tell the teachers that this was an intelligence test, but that it was a new tool to identify
’late bloomers’, i.e. children who were likely to show a sudden and dramatic intellectual
spurt over the upcoming school year. But although the ’late bloomers’ were actually
selected at random, Rosenthal and Jacobson (1968) could show that in an IQ test which
was administered one year later they gained signi￿cantly better test scores than the
control students. Thus, the false expectations of the teachers (who had been informed
about the arti￿cially created group of late bloomers) had become true. 3 Whereas many
social psychologists took Pygmalion as a con￿rmation of their thesis that social reality
is mainly created by one’s own expectations, educational psychologists were much more
skeptical with regard to Pygmalion’s methodological prerequisites and the possibility of
alternative explanations which, according to them, Rosenthal and Jacobson (1968) have
not su￿ciently controlled for (Jussim and Harber, 2005, 139). 4
Trying to refute his critics, Rosenthal became one of the pioneers in meta-analyses.
His and Rubin’s (Rosenthal and Rubin, 1978) meta-analysis of the ￿rst 345 studies
from various research categories (reaction time, inkblot tests, animal learning, labora-
tory interviews, psychophysical judgments, learning and ability, person perception, and
everyday life situations) concluded that self-ful￿lling prophecies do exist and show e￿ect
sizes between d = .14 up to d = 1.73 and r = .07 up to r = .65 (Rosenthal and Rubin,
1978, table 1). A second meta-analysis based on a more narrowly de￿ned set of ’Pyg-
malion’ studies could examine that the e￿ect of teachers’ expectations on students’ IQ
scores was .16 by average (Smith, 1980). Raudenbush (1984) found an e￿ect size of .11
by average and could additionally reveal that the e￿ect of teachers’ expectations at t0
on later IQ scores at t1 highly depends on how long the teachers are already teaching in
the particular class.5
Due to his caress, the statue ￿nally gets alive, they marry and have a son.
3While social psychology di￿erentiates between the Pygmalion e￿ect of self-ful￿lling over-estimations
and the Golem e￿ect of self-ful￿lling under-estimations, we use the more common term of Pygmalion
to capture both types of self-ful￿lling prophecies.
4Critics remarked that both groups of children ￿ late bloomers and controls ￿ showed IQ gains over
the next year. The di￿erences between the gains of the two groups (four percentage points) are
signi￿cant, but less ’dramatic’ than the gross IQ gain of 12 percent of the experimental group
students would suggest. For this and other critiques with regard to the original Rosenthal and
Jacobson (1968) study see Thorndike (1968); Jensen (1969); Snow (1969); Elasho￿ and Snow (1971);
Wineburg (1987); Roth (1995) and Jussim and Harber (2005).
5A duration of less than 5 weeks can yield to an e￿ect size of up to .55, whereas a duration of 24
weeks led to an e￿ect size of -.13 (Raudenbush, 1984, 91). Thus, the longer a teacher is teaching in
a particular class, the better he knows his or her students and the smaller are the consequences of
possible misjudgments.
6Although critics like Wineburg (1987) refused to accept an impact of teachers’ expecta-
tions on students’ intelligence scores, Raudenbush (1994) re-analyzed the 18 experiments
of his earlier study (Raudenbush, 1984) based on random e￿ect models and now found
an e￿ect size even of r=.20.
Need for moderators Given these results, one evident weakness of ’Pygmalion’ regard-
less of its operationalization lies in an insu￿cient control of both student and teacher
background variables as moderators. 6 In particular, more research is clearly needed
with regard to students’ social backgrounds as moderators (Jussim and Harber, 2005).
Concretely, there are only three studies who explicitly tested for these e￿ects: First,
Madon et al. (1997) found that self-ful￿lling prophecies are stronger among students
who had a ’prior history of low-achievement’ which was operationalized as their stan-
dardized results of a test which had been administered previously to the actual exper-
iment. Although their operationalization of self-ful￿lling prophecies as teachers’ over-
and under-estimations ￿ in terms of the residuals of a regression of three di￿erent teacher
perception variables (related to students’ performance, talent and e￿ort) on a set of stu-
dent background variables ￿ appears to be promising, for their purpose of identifying
moderator variables it surely su￿ers from a serious methodological weakness. 7Second,
Jussim et al. (1996) found evidence that self-ful￿lling prophecies are moderated by both
social class and ethnicity variables. In their study, the standardized relationship be-
tween teachers’ perceptions and students’ future test scores was about .25 for students
with lower educated parents and .03 for students with higher educated parents. Similar
di￿erences could be detected between white students and African-American students
in terms of a standardized e￿ect size of .14 and .37, respectively. Third, Madon et al.
(1998) found that teachers’ perceptions about students’ performance and talent (but not
about their ability) correlate bivariately with students’ social class (operationalized as an
index of parental education and parental income). However, these bivariate associations
diminish when additional predictors like students’ school grades, intelligence test scores
and their motivation are introduced in multivariate analyses. Hence, the biggest part
of the di￿erences that teachers ￿nd between social groups closely correspond to actual
di￿erences in prior grades and achievement tests.
Implications What does this overall mixed evidence suggest? First, the phenomenon of
a self-ful￿lling prophecy is hard to identify analytically. As we saw, not only experimental-
group students achieved a gain in their IQ test scores but also control-group students
6Among the few exceptions of empirical studies which take moderator e￿ects into account, the meta-
analysis by Raudenbush (1984) which found that the e￿ect size of self-ful￿lling prophecies varies with
teachers’ duration in class has already been mentioned. Moreover, in the same study Raudenbush
(1984) found that the e￿ect also varies by grade level. And ￿nally, self-ful￿lling prophecies appear
to be weaker in more ’di￿erential’ teacher treatment contexts (Brattesani et al., 1984).
7Concretely, among the set of background variables that was used to identify teachers’ over- and under-
estimations, we can ￿nd students’ ￿fth-grade math test scores ￿ which were also used to identify low
and high achievers (Madon et al., 1997, 798). Therefore, it is not surprising that the authors ￿nd a
variation in the e￿ect size of self-ful￿lling prophecies based on this variable.
7(Rosenthal and Jacobson, 1968). Second, we can note that one solution might be to
compute a ’net’ e￿ect of self-ful￿lling prophecies in the way of Madon et al. (1997).
Although those strategies evidently are not without pitfalls, they might be helpful in
separating self-ful￿lling prophecy e￿ects from other intervening mechanisms. Third, and
most important, we saw that self-ful￿lling prophecy research lacks of a su￿cient consid-
eration of student background variables. Exactly this is the adequate point to bring the
SEU-IEO framework back in: Just as self-ful￿lling prophecy research needs the consider-
ation of student background variables, the SEU-IEO framework lacks the consideration
of exactly that endogeneity of the probability of educational success which is the main
point of all Pygmalion studies. The task of the next section will be to integrate the main
idea of a ’net’ e￿ect of a self-ful￿lling prophecy into the SEU-IEO framework.
2.3 Development of an SEU model of self-ful￿lling prophecies
Given the utility relations of the conventional SEU-IEO model as it has been outlined in
section 2.1, educational decisions would be a direct function of net utility. However, this
seems to be only half of the truth for it would neglect the idea of a self-ful￿lling prophecy
in the classroom. In line with the main idea of Pygmalion, claiming that a teacher’s
expectations may have a distinct e￿ect on later school achievement implies that the ’real’
transition rates are not only a result of ’subjective’ parental utility comparisons, but also
of ’objective’ interactions in the classroom: "A shortcoming of the standard economic
approach to decision making is that it ignores the endogeneity of preferences - that
students’ preferences are socially constructed through interaction with peers and other
signi￿cant persons" (Lauen, 2007, 183). The consequence of admitting an endogeneity of
preferences in the classroom is to assume also an endogeneity of pep, i.e. of the subjective
probability of successfully completing the chosen school track. Recall that following
Breen and Goldthorpe (1997), the subjective probability of educational success depends
on students’ objective school performance (in their notation i = g(ai)). In accordance
with Esser’s (1999) notation, we could write
Pep = f(AP); (5)
while AP denotes students’ academic performance. Claiming that teacher expectations
in terms of a ’net’ e￿ect of self-ful￿lling prophecies (Madon et al., 1997) at time t   1,
TEt 1, may in￿uence students’ academic outcomes at a later time t reduces to
APt = g(TEt 1): (6)
For Pept thus holds
Pept = f(g(TEt 1)) (7)
￿ meaning that parental subjective probability assumptions are a function of students’
objective school performance which is, in terms of a self-ful￿lling prophecy, dependent
on the earlier teacher expectations. If we apply this idea on Esser’s (1999) formal model
8and simply abbreviate the relation in (6) by SFP to indicate that it captures the idea
of a self-ful￿lling prophecy, we can write it as follows:
EU(Ab) > EU(An)
if
B + PsdSD > C=Pep
with
Pep = f(SFP): (8)
Now we can infer that self-ful￿lling prophecies will also a￿ect students’ later transition
decisions via their impact on the subjective expected performance assessments. 8
2.4 Hypotheses
After these theoretical considerations our main hypothesis is easily outlined: We postu-
late that teachers’ expectations - once they are operationalized in terms of a self-ful￿lling
prophecy - have distinct e￿ects on students’ educational success. By ’distinct e￿ects’ we
mean that they will have a signi￿cant impact besides the convenient theoretical concepts
of the SEU-IEO model (Esser, 1999). While the latter has usually been applied to the
transition decisions from primary to secondary education 9, one central claim of the ini-
tial Breen-Goldthorpe model (Breen and Goldthorpe, 1997) is that secondary e￿ects of
social inequality do not only a￿ect the actual transition decisions but also the decision
for or against continuing the chosen school track.10 Consequently, in the ￿rst step of our
analyses we will use the SEU-IEO model to predict the probability of 10th class students
to achieve a German high school degree (’Abitur’). In a second step, we will also model
their transition probability to tertiary education in terms of starting academic studies.
Therefore, we will test two sets of hypotheses consisting each of 8 single statements,
H1a H8a and H1b H8b. The ￿rst ￿ve hypotheses of each set test the standard SEU-IEO
model for students’ probability to achieve a German high school degree ( H1a H5a) and
to start academic studies (H1b   H5b), respectively. H6a;H7a;H6b and H7b address the
combined SEU terms which Esser (1999) calls educational motivation and investment
risk. The last hypotheses of each set, H8a and H8b, extend the SEU-IEO model by the
idea of a distinct e￿ect of teacher expectations in terms of a self-ful￿lling prophecy:
H1a : Students’ probability of achieving a high school degree increases with the bene￿t of
higher education, B.
8One question that might arise at this point is why self-ful￿lling prophecies should have a distinct im-
pact on students’ academic outcome apart from an objective measure of their academic performance
at t   1, APt 1. The answer to this point is given in section 3.3, when the idea of a net e￿ect of
self-ful￿lling prophecies will be operationalized as the residuals of a regression of teacher evaluations
on a performative component, and a motivational component, respectively (see Madon et al., 1997).
9Exceptions are Jonsson (1999); Need and De Jong (2001); Becker and Hecken (2008, 2009), and,
without a direct operationalization of the SEU indicators, Hillmert and Jacob (2010).
10See Schneider (2008) for an empirical test of this hypothesis.
9H2a : Students’ probability of achieving a high school degree increases with the value of status
decline,  SD.
H3a : Students’ probability of achieving a high school degree increases with the expected prob-
ability of status decline, Psd.
H4a : Students’ probability of achieving a high school degree increases with the expected edu-
cational performance, Pep.
H5a : Students’ probability of achieving a high school degree decreases with the expected costs
of education, C.
H6a : Students’ probability of achieving a high school degree increases with their educational
motivation, B + psd  SD.
H7a : Students’ probability of achieving a high school degree decreases with their subjective
investment risk, C=pep.
H8a : Students’ probability of achieving a high school degree increases with (positive) self-
ful￿lling prophecies, SFP.
H1b : Students’ probability of beginning academic studies increases with the bene￿t of higher
education, B.
H2b : Students’ probability of beginning academic studies increases with the value of status
decline,  SD.
H3b : Students’ probability of beginning academic studies increases with the expected proba-
bility of status decline, Psd.
H4b : Students’ probability of beginning academic studies increases with the expected educa-
tional performance, Pep.
H5b : Students’ probability of beginning academic studies decreases with the expected costs of
education, C.
H6b : Students’ probability of beginning academic studies increases with their educational mo-
tivation, B + psd  SD.
H7b : Students’ probability of beginning academic studies decreases with their subjective in-
vestment risk, C=pep.
H8b : Students’ probability of beginning academic studies increases with (positive) self-ful￿lling
prophecies, SFP.
It should become clear at this point that our aim is not to test Pygmalion explicitly. Due
to data restrictions, we are not able to test for a direct impact of teacher expectations
on students’ future school performance. However, the considerations from section 2.3
suggest that given an adequate operationalization of self-ful￿lling prophecies, in the long
run we can expect an indirect e￿ect of teachers’ expectations on both students’ educa-
tional success and transition decisions via their (unobserved) subjective expectations of
educational success at a later point in time. Exactly this is what H8a and H8b are trying
to capture.11
11In this context, one could also refer to the distinction between substantive and empirical statistical
models (Cox, 1990), or between scienti￿c models presented in statistical form and statistical models
per se (Rogosa, 1987; Sł rensen, 1998). The point is that the former ￿are intended to represent
real processes that have causal force (whether or not directly observable)￿ while the latter ￿are
103 Operationalization
3.1 Data
All analyses will be based on a German panel dataset which is known as the ’K￿l-
ner Gymnasiasten-Panel’ (engl. ’Cologne Highschool Panel’, in the following abbre-
viated as CHiSP). The CHiSP consists of an initial (student-level) survey from 1969
(Gesis-No.: ZA0600) with N=3385 10th-grade Gymnasium12students in North Rhine-
Westphalia with two re-surveys in 1985 (Gesis-No.: ZA1441; N= 1987) and 1996/97
(Gesis-No.: ZA4228; N=1596). In the initial survey, students were asked about issues
like their performance, interests and plans in school and about their social origin and
their relationship to their parents. Simultaneously with the initial survey, the students
took part in an Intelligence Structure Test (IST) containing four sub-scales as developed
by Amthauer (1957). At the same time, also the students’ teachers (Gesis-No.: ZA0640;
N=1701) and their parents (Gesis-No.: ZA0639; N=2646) have been surveyed. The
main items of the parent questionnaire were about their social background, their style of
raising children and their aspirations for their children. Amongst others, teachers were
asked about a couple of evaluative and other pedagogic issues. In an investigation of
the Central Archive for Empirical Research in Cologne (today known as Gesis - Leibniz
Institute for the Social Sciences) the 10th class and Abitur grades (if passed) could be
examined and were merged with the data. In the two re-surveys, the former students
gave detailed information about their educational and occupational careers until the age
of 43. We chose these admittedly older data because to the best of our knowledge, it is
the only available longitudinal dataset that contains an appropriate measure of teach-
ers’ expectations that can be used to construct over- and underestimations in order to
operationalize self-ful￿lling prophecies adequately. This indicator will be described in
the next but one paragraph.
3.2 Variables
Dependent Variable In the hypotheses section we identi￿ed two dependent variables.
The ￿rst dependent variable is de￿ned by the fact if the students have achieved a high
school degree (Abitur) or not. While the CHiSP also includes information about whether
the former students have ever achieved Abitur in their later life, we will focus on those
students only who achieved Abitur during the regular schooling time. This appears to
be logically consistent since secondary e￿ects of social inequality can also be understood
as a decision for vs. against continuing higher education (Breen and Goldthorpe, 1997;
Schneider, 2008). Hence, we want to focus only on students who passed Abitur on the
￿rst try (event=1) use all observations who did not achieve Abitur within 3 years after
those which sociologists normally use and are concerned with relations among variables that may
be determined through techniques of rather general applicability￿ (Goldthorpe, 2001, p. 14).
12For more detailed descriptions of the German educational system see J￿rges and Schneider (2006);
Pietsch and Stubbe (2007); Schneider (2008).
11the 10th class survey in 1969 as a reference (=0). 13 The second dependent variable is
given by the fact if the former students have ever started academic studies. Since our
analyses will be based on panel data, we have to take into account that from a theoretical
point of view it would be possible that the former students could start academic studies
at any time ￿ including data points that are later than the last survey of the CHiSP (i.e.
1997). This problem will be solved empirically in section 4.1.
Independent Variables The expected bene￿t of education, B is operationalized by
students’ appraisement if Abitur would be necessary for them to reach their aim in
life. Students could reply 1 ’yes, necessary’; 2 ’useful, but not necessary’; and 3 ’not
important’. We dichotomized this variable into the two categories 0 ’not important’
and 1 ’useful or necessary’. The value of status decline,  SD, is measured by parents’
disappointment if child would not pass Abitur. The categories of this variables are 1
’not much’; 2 ’little’; 3 ’very disappointed’; 4 ’would be the worst’. We dichotomized
this variable as follows: 0 ’not much / little’; 1 ’very disappointed / would be the
worst’. We operationalize the expected status decline, psd by parents’ assessments about
the importance of good Abitur grades for students’ later occupational success. The
original categories of this variable (1 ’little’; 2 ’not that much’; 3 ’big’; 4 ’very big’)
were dichotomized into 0 ’little / not much’ and 1 ’big / very big’. Students’ subjective
educational performance pep is measured by a probability assumption of the parents
whether their children are able to complete the chosen school track. The original variable
(1 ’de￿nitely’; 2 ’probably’; 3 ’don’t know’; 4 ’probably not’) is recoded as follows: 0
’probably not/don’t know’; 1 ’probably/de￿nitely’. The expected costs of education, C,
are operationalized by parents’ assessment if they had to make ￿nancial sacri￿ces in
order to o￿er higher education to their children. Again, the original categories of the
variable (1 ’no’, 2 ’little’ and 3 ’yes’ are recoded into a dummy variable: 0 ’no/little’; 1
’yes’.
Self-ful￿lling prophecies , SFP, should adequately be operationalized based on teach-
ers’ expectations. In the CHiSP the latter are measured by a speci￿c form of teachers’
evaluations: Teachers were asked to evaluate by a dichotomous decision which students
they suppose to be able for academic studies and which of them not. Since the question
was put open, teachers could mention students as being able, being not able, or not at
all.
This data structure causes two problems. First, each student could be evaluated by
more than one teacher, and each teacher could evaluate more than one student. An
analysis of the intra-class correlations (ICC) revealed a considerable variance of multiple
evaluations for each student (not shown). Second, the openness of the question is not
without problems because it has to be clari￿ed whether the ’missing’ category really can
be treated technically as a missing value or if we would loose substantive information
when proceeding on this assumption.
13Since the zero point of counting has been backdated to January 1967 and we do not want to exclude
students who had to participate in makeup exams, we set the cut-o￿ value to 80 months beginning
from the starting point.
12To overcome the ￿rst problem, our analysis here will focus on teacher evaluations only
of class teachers. We expect that the intra-individual variance of teachers’ evaluations
partially depends on the quality of teacher-student relationships. We assume that class
teachers have a more intense relationship to and a better knowledge of their students
than ’ordinary’ teachers. Thus, regarding only class teachers’ evaluations will both
simplify the data structure and overcome the problem of variance. 14 To overcome the
second problem, as a preliminary analysis we have estimated two logistic regressions of
the chance of getting a positive evaluation vs. getting a negative one or none at all on
students’ intelligence, average grade, social background, motivation and sex (not shown).
We found that for the analysis of the chance of getting a positive evaluation vs. not
getting one at all, the e￿ect sizes of all independent variables are in the same direction,
but notably lower than for the analysis of the chance of getting a positive evaluation vs.
getting a negative one. Thus, we can conclude that students who are not mentioned at
all rank lower in teachers’ perceptions than students with a good teacher evaluation but
higher than students with a bad teacher evaluation. However, in these analyses we will
look at the unambiguous values of this variable in terms of the opposition of positive vs.
negative teacher evaluations.
Based on this dichotomy SFP is measured as follows: Teachers’ evaluations are re-
gressed on two sets of students’ backgrounds: an ability component and a motivational
component. The ability component consists of students’ scores in the Intelligence Struc-
ture Test (Amthauer, 1957) and their average grade (both z-transformed). The moti-
vational component consists of students’ subjective assessments of i) their homework
e￿ort, ii) their relative school performance, and iii) their self-con￿dence (all 11-point
Likert scaled). Teachers’ evaluations are subsequently regressed on these two sets of
student backgrounds, resulting in three di￿erent logistic regression models: one for each
set, and a ’full’ model with all predictors. The models read as follows:
logit(TE) = 0 + 1intell + 2av:grade (9)
logit(TE) = 0 + 3homew:eff + 4subj:rank + 5self:conf (10)
logit(TE) = 0 + 1intell + 2av:grade
+ 3homew:eff + 4subj:rank + 5self:conf;
(11)
where (9) denotes the performance model, (10) the motivation model, and (11) the full
model. The residuals of (9) to (11) are stored and will be used as predictors for students’
propensity to achieve Abitur and to start academic studies, respectively (see Madon et
al., 1997 for a similar operationalization of self-ful￿lling prophecies). The residuals ri of
logistic regressions are de￿ned as ri = yi  logit 1(Xi) (Gelman and Hill, 2007, p. 97),
where in our case yi is the observed teacher evaluation and logit 1(Xi) is the value
of each teacher’s evaluation that is predicted by equations (9) to (11). In this design,
14As regards social mechanisms, we further expect that class teachers’ evaluations might very well be
an approximation of teachers’ evaluations in general: There is good reason to presume a notable
amount of communication between teachers, e.g. in the teachers’ lounge, and especially class teachers
could be agenda setters in terms of shaping other teachers’ expectations.
13positive residuals indicate relative over-estimations and negative residuals relative under-
estimations compared to the respective set of predictors in the logit models. For later
analyses we will dichotomize each residual whether it takes positive or negative values.
By this procedure, it is possible to separate a ’net’ e￿ect of self-ful￿lling prophecies from
a varying set of background variables (Madon et al., 1997). 15
As regards the distinction between primary and secondary e￿ects of social inequality,
in both the performance model and the full model, di￿erences in the distribution of
students’ teacher evaluations which are due to primary factors like their intelligence are
explicitly ruled out. According to the assumptions in the theoretical model, the e￿ect of
the residuals from these models on students’ actual transition propensities should only
exist due to a mechanism of secondary e￿ects in terms of di￿erent subjective expected
transition probabilities ￿ which are in turn assumed to be the consequence of di￿erent
teacher treatments.
3.3 Covariates
To keep a check on the unobserved heterogeneity of our predictors (also see section 4.3),
our analyses control for parental social class and educational attainment. Social class is
measured by the occupational prestige (Treiman scores) of the head of household - while
the latter is based on a variable that takes the highest value of occupational prestige
from either mother or father.
The parental educational attainment was measured by 13 categories reaching from
lower secondary school without an apprenticeship up to a university degree. We cate-
gorized this variable into 1 ’lower education’; 2 ’middle education’; 3 ’higher education’
and 4 ’degree’.
3.4 Models
In our models we will mainly follow the operationalization that has been provided by
Becker (2003). First all predictors will be regressed on parental social class via Probit
estimations. The estimates will be stored as Inverse Mill’s Ratios (IMRs) and will be
introduced in the second-step logit estimation of students’ probability of passing Abitur
to control for panel mortality (Heckman, 1979). This will be repeated for students’
propensity to start academic studies.
The general assumption of this statistical technique is that in many social situations
the outcome of primary interest yi not only depends on a vector of covariates  but
15An issue that could be objected against this strategy concerns the possibility of private information.
More speci￿cally, besides the variables in the three models, teachers could ground their decisions on
two di￿erent types of unobservables: a component that is known to the teacher when she makes an
evaluation decision but not to the analyst, and a component that might not even be known to the
teacher herself (Cunha et al., 2005; Cunha and Heckman, 2007). While it can be argued that the
latter case would be in line with the general idea of a self-ful￿lling prophecy (although the particular
mechanism behind it would remain un-revealed), we tackle the implications of the former scenario
in our robustness analyses in section 4.3.
14also on a variable zi that determines whether individual i will ever entry in the social
situation or not. Thus, the crucial assumption is that we will only observe yi if zi >0,
and therefore we ￿rst have to ￿nd the determinants of zi (on which the latter should be
regressed) before we can say anything about the relationship between  and yi. In more








Since, as mentioned, yi is only observed if zi > 0, the error terms of both equations,
ui and i, share the correlation . The consequence of this error correlation is that
conventional OLS regression that only considers equation 2 produces inconsistent and
ine￿cient estimates (cf. Greene, 2003; Wooldridge, 2006). 16 This selection problem can
be solved by a two step estimation of both equations: First the selection equation is
estimated via Probit regression:




Prob(zi = 0jwi) = 1   (w
0
i):
Then the estimates of 







In a second step, i is included as a covariate in the equation of primary interest.
This two-step procedure is intended to yield a more precise estimate of i because by
controlling for  as a metric instrumental variable for the exogenous determinants of the
selection equation, also the problematic error correlation  is canceled out.
In our case, there is evidence to assume two di￿erent sources of sample selection in the
data. First, the distribution of our independent variables is expected to vary by parental
social strata (Becker, 2000, 2003): Social backgrounds might a￿ect both the de￿nition
and evaluation of the social situation, and thus also the decision for or against a higher
track of education. Therefore, by regressing all SEU predictors on parental social class
(selection equation) and including the IMRs of these estimates in the equation of interest,
we are able to control for the causal impact of class-speci￿c resources, conditions and
constrains:
From the methodological point of view, the following aspects are considered sepa-
rately: (1) the unobserved heterogeneity based on the interrelation between social
class and social action; (2) the social selectivity of resources, educational prefer-
ences, and educational performance among social classes; (3) the social selectivity
16In this case, OLS estimates are inconsistent due to the omitted variable wi and ine￿cient due to the
heteroscedasticity in terms of .
15of the evaluation of the costs and bene￿ts of continued education; and (4) the
problem of causal inference in the decision problem (Becker, 2003, p. 15). 17
With regard to our self-ful￿lling prophecy residuals, recall that one central shortcoming
of the empirical literature of Pygmalion a￿ects an insu￿cient consideration of students’
social backgrounds. By applying the same Heckit model on the dichotomized SFP
residuals, it is possible to control for the variance of self-ful￿lling prophecies by parental
social class.
Second, evidently the propensities of the former students to start academic studies
strongly depend on the fact whether they successfully graduated from Gymnasium or not.
Although for some particular subjects like music or art a special qualifying examination
can substitute a high school degree, in most cases transitions to university can only
be observed if Abitur has been passed successfully. Thus, the theoretical problem of
conditional transition rates (Breen and Goldthorpe, 1997) should also be solved as a
methodological problem of selection bias.
Concretely, we will estimate the following models: First, as mentioned, parents’ ex-
pected bene￿t of higher education B, their subjective value of status decline  SD, the
expected status decline psd, students’ probability of successfully completing the chosen
school track pep, the expected costs of education C, and our dichotomized indicator for
self-ful￿lling prophecies SFP will be regressed on parental occupational prestige in bi-
variate probit equations to compensate for social selection bias in the distribution of our
predictors. The results of these probits will be stored as Inverse Mill’s Ratios ij. By
subscripts i;j we address that each individual i will get an own Inverse Mill’s Ratio for
each selection equation j. In a second step, each ij is introduced in our ￿rst equation
of primary interest, which predicts the individual probabilities to pass Abitur:
logitABI = pepB + (1   pep)( SD)   C + SFP + ij: (12)
Second, we will re-estimate (12) as a probit equation and equally store the resulting
estimates as IMRs in order to control for sample selection with regard to the transition
rates to university. In addition to (12), this model also includes direct controls for
parental social class and educational backgrounds:
logitUNI = pepB + (1   pep)( SD)   C + SFP + ij + class + educ: (13)
This procedure is summarized graphically in ￿gure 2.


























Figure 2: A modi￿ed model of Inequality in Educational Opportunities. Own Contribu-
tion. Extension of Becker (2003, p. 7).
174 Results
4.1 Distribution of Variables
Dependent Variables In ￿gure 3a the distribution of the time span until students
passed Abitur is displayed. Recall that the zero point of counting has been backdated to
January 1967. We can see that the distribution of passing Abitur over time corresponds
to our cut-o￿ value of 80 months. Most of the students passed Abitur on the ￿rst try, a
quite small amount on the second try, and even less on the third try. Figure 3b captures
the distribution of the time span until the former students have started academic studies.
Most of the students started academic studies immediately after having passed Abitur,
and some smaller amounts with a delay of one to two years. After 106 months beginning
from the starting point ￿ which is equal to October two years after high school graduation
￿ the amount of students who begin academic studies tremendously drops down. Thus,
we choose this value as the cut-o￿ for dichotomization of our second dependent variable.































(a) Distribution of educational success
over time


































(b) Distribution of university transitions
over time
Figure 3: Distribution of educational success and university transitions over time
Main Independent Variable: Teacher Evaluations Now we present the distribution
of teachers’ evaluations both numerically (￿gure 4a) and graphically (￿gure 4b). It
can be noted that the amount of students who received a positive teacher evaluation
(30.9%) is higher than the amount of students who received a negative one (25.4%) ￿
but evidently most students did not receive any teacher evaluation at all (43.7%). As
mentioned in section 3.2, for the following operationalization of self-ful￿lling prophecies
we will only focus on positive vs. negative teacher evaluations.
Residuals of Over- and Under-Estimations Next we present the results of our logit
equations (9) to (11) that we use to extract the ’net’ e￿ects of self-ful￿lling prophecies.
18teacher evaluation
not able able not mentioned /
missing
Row Total
n 616 751 1060 2427
% students 25.4 30.9 43.7 100.0
% mentioned 45.1 54.9 - -
N(total) = 3385.
(a) Numerical distribution of teacher evaluations
not able able not mentioned





















(b) Graphical distribution of
teacher evaluations
Figure 4: Distribution of teacher evaluations: ability for academic studies
Model 1 contains the performance model, model 2 the motivation model, and model 3
the full model with all predictors from both models 1 and 2 (see table 1). 18As regards
the performance model (model 1), we can note that both students’ intelligence and their
school grades signi￿cantly predict teacher evaluations. The R2 of this model is remark-
ably high. However, except of the measure for students’ relative school performance,
in the motivation model, the z-values are much lower (self-con￿dence) or do not even
reach statistical signi￿cance (homework e￿ort). This also results in an R2 not much
more than half as high as for the performance model. Considering the predictors of both
models together, in the full model, except students’ relative school performance, only
performance-model indicators remain signi￿cant ￿ while the explained variance of the
full model is only slightly higher than for the performance model. Thus, we conclude
that students’ performance is far more important for the teachers than their motivation.
As mentioned, we now store the residuals in order to use them as an operational-
ization of a ’net’ e￿ect of self-ful￿lling prophecies. Figure 5 displays the distribution
of the residuals from the three di￿erent logit models. Positive residuals indicate an
over-estimation relative to the predictors of the logit models, negative residuals a rel-
ative under-estimation. In accordance with the predictive power of the performance
model, the residuals in ￿gure 5a mainly follow a normal distribution: Most students
get a teacher evaluation that is quite in line with their intelligence and school grades
￿ leading to a residuum of zero. If we compare this distribution with the one of the
residuals from the motivation model, we can note that students’ motivation hardly suits
to predict teachers’ evaluations: Two local maxima can be found at 0.5 and -0.5, respec-
tively ￿ indicating that based on this background variables, the teacher evaluations do
not become better than simply by guessing. Finally, when we look at the distribution
of the full-model residuals, we see that the curve gets slightly distorted, but still is very
close to the normal distribution. As noted before, we dichotomized each residual for the
18For these and all subsequent models, missing values have been deleted listwise (for more details see
Allison, 2002).
19Table 1: Logistic Regression of Teacher Evaluations on Students’ Performance and
Motivation




average grade 0.15*** 0.20***
(-16.79) (-14.01)
homework e￿ort 1.03 1.08
(0.50) (0.88)




Nagelkerke’s R2 0.52 0.27 0.55
N 1309.00 1294.00 1287.00
All coe￿cients are standardized odds ratios. Z-values in parentheses. Signi￿cance values:
* (p < .05); ** (p < .01); *** (p < .001).
following analyses.
















































































Figure 5: Distribution of Residuals of Teacher Evaluations on students’ performance and
motivation, and the combination of both
Bivariate Probit Estimates In this section we brie￿y discuss the results from the
bivariate probit regressions of our SEU predictors of primary interest, B, pep, SD, psd,
and C on parental social class (see ￿gure 6a). Blue bars indicate signi￿cantly posi-
tive coe￿cients, red bars signi￿cantly negative coe￿cients, and grey bars insigni￿cant
coe￿cients.
Among the SEU predictors, only the expected bene￿t B is positively predicted by
parental social class ￿ meaning that parents from higher social strata expect more ben-













































Figure 6: Standardized Bivariate Probit Estimates of SEU Predictors and Self-Ful￿lling
Prophecy Residuals On Parental Social Class
e￿t from higher education. Not surprisingly, social class is negatively related to the
subjective assessment of the costs of education. What might surprise, however, is that
social class is also negatively related to parents’ assessment of the probability of the
impact of the expected status decline: While parents from lower social strata seem to
be more concerned about the potential impact of a lacking Abitur on their children’s’
later life, parents from the higher strata appear to show much more trust that due to
their higher resources they would be able to make straight paths for their children even
in case of a failed ￿nal exam. With regard to  SD and pep, no signi￿cant associations
were found.
Figure 6b shows that all three types of residuals are positively predicted by parental
social class. Hence, students from the higher social strata are more likely to be over-
estimated by their teachers compared to their actual performance and motivation.
214.2 Multivariate Analyses
First we present the logistic regression estimates of students’ probability of passing
Abitur on both Esser’s (1999) SEU predictors and our self-ful￿lling prophecy residuals.
We subsequently introduce our predictors and correction terms in our models, so that
we will present the following models: Model 1a contains the convenient SEU-Predictors
(Esser, 1999) B,  SD, psd, pep and C. In model 2a to 4a we separately introduce the
performance residuals, the motivation residuals, and the full-model residuals in order
to model the impact of self-ful￿lling prophecies. Models 1b to 4b contain the same
variables as models 1a - 4a but additionally correct for sample selection bias in terms of
the Inverse Mill’s Ratios that have been stored from the bivariate probit models from
￿gure 6. Models 1c to 4c repeat the same proceeding for the terms that Esser calls
￿educational motivation￿, B + psd  SD, and the ￿investment risk￿, C=pep. And models
1d to 4d additionally control for potential selection bias in models 2c to 4c. Since the
regression models with separate IMR variables seriously su￿ered from multicollinearity
(the inter-correlation between the IMRs lies between an absolute value of .97 and .99),
we summed up the IMR scores for all SEU predictors to one single IMR score. 19
Second, in models 5a to 8d we present the estimates of another series of logistic
regressions of students’ transitions to university. The setup of these models is the same
as in models 1a to 4d, except that models 5b to 8b and 5d to 8d now include the Inverse
Mill’s Ratios for the estimates of a probit version of models 1b-4b and 1d-4d, respectively.
Since the results for the self-ful￿lling prophecy residual estimates do not substantively
di￿er when the SEU interaction terms instead of the ￿main indicators￿ are introduced
in the model, the tables with the interaction terms are not discussed in depth here but
reported in the appendix (tables B and C).
Passing Abitur As table 2 shows, in the baseline model without any self-ful￿lling
prophecy indicator nor with controls for sample selection, all SEU parameters except the
perceived costs of education C have a signi￿cant impact on students’ educational success
in terms of passing Abitur. Possibly, the fact that costs do not come into play in this
model can be explained by the life course or selection hypothesis (Blossfeld and Shavit,
1993; Mare, 1980, 1993) which postulates that the e￿ects of social inequality decrease
during students’ educational career. However, high school graduation still varies by the
expected bene￿t of graduation, the expected amount of status decline and its expected
impact, and the subjective probability of educational success.
Interestingly, when we introduce the SFP residuals from the performance model ( model
2a), the latter are highly signi￿cant while the e￿ects of B,  SD and psd are canceled
out, and the signi￿cance level of the estimate of pep drops down from the 99.9% level to
19The scale reliability of the IMR sum score is about Cronbach’s  = .84. Because the inter-correlations
between the single IMR scores is in all cases near to one, the assumption of equal weights as it is
always implied in simple sum scores is appropriate. For multicollinearity problems with lower inter-
correlations a latent variable approach with free factor loadings for the IMR scores would be more
adequate (Cohen et al., 2003). However, in our case, a con￿rmatory factor analysis with factor

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































23the 95% level. In our theoretical section we have argued that pep = f(SFP) (8), and
although, admittedly, we are not able to model this impact over time, the drop-down in
both e￿ect size and signi￿cance of pep may strengthen this proposition. Moreover, for the
case of the operationalization of self-ful￿lling prophecies according to the performance
model, we can conclude that they have a signi￿cant impact on students’ educational
success of passing Abitur: With regard to content, the probability to graduate immedi-
ately on the ￿rst try and with no class repetition is almost 2.9 times as high for students
who have been over-estimated by their teachers with regard to their 10th class academic
performance compared to students who have been under-estimated.
In model 3a we can see that the residuals from the motivation model of table 1
also signi￿cantly predict students’ educational success. However, and in line with the
low predictive power of the motivation model, both e￿ect size and t-value are lower
compared to model 2a. Therefore, a teacher’s evaluation nearly as a thing in itself,
i.e. with no signi￿cant reduction in variation caused by its predictors, also signi￿cantly
a￿ects students’ educational success. Yet this e￿ect is enlarged if we are able to control
for substantial over- and underestimations. In opposition to model 2a, the subjective
expected bene￿t and the expected amount of status decline remain signi￿cant in model
3a.
Model model 4a shows that the residuals of the full model containing both perfor-
mance and motivation predictors not only have a lower estimate and t-value compared
to models 2a and 3a, but also lead to a decrease in model ￿t. Thus, if a teachers’
evaluation is controlled for both students’ performance and their motivation, over- and
underestimations explain less of the variance of students’ academic success. Moreover, if
students’ motivation is considered, di￿erences in ’conventional’ SEU parameters remain
important.
When controls for sample selection are introduced in Models 1b-4d, the main di￿erence
to the a-models is that in two models, pep looses its signi￿cant impact on students’
educational success. However, it is important to note that none of the self-ful￿lling
prophecy residuals is a￿ected by sample selection correction. Since we indexed the
Inverse Mills Ratios for the SEU predictors, we assume that this particular robustness
is not an artefact of multicollinearity. Hence, while at least the distribution of success
expectations may be explained by issues of social selectivity, it appears that for the case
of educational success, the impact of over- and underestimations remains stable against
social selectivity.
starting academic studies In table 3, the impact of both SEU predictors and self-
ful￿lling prophecy residuals on students’ transitions to university are presented. Ad-
ditionally to table 2, and according to the model by Becker (2003), the analyses also
control for parental social class and education.
In contrast to table 2, in model 5a, only the expected bene￿t, B, and the subjective
expected utility of successfully completing the chosen school track, pep, have a positive
impact on student’ propensity to start academic studies. Both indicators for the expected



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































25As in table 2, the e￿ects for B are canceled out when self-ful￿lling prophecies are
introduced in models 6a - 8a ￿ while the coe￿cient of pep remains stable. Again, the
estimate for the performance-model residuals ( model 6a) has the highest impact on
the dependent variable, and the estimate for the full-model residuals the lowest ( model
8a). However, compared to the estimates in models 1a-4a, the e￿ect sizes diminished
between 11.5 (full model) and 13.8 (motivation model) percent, and also the R2 statistics
are notably lower now. Thus, the e￿ects of self-ful￿lling prophecies seem to decrease in
the educational life course.20 Both parental social class and education do not have a
signi￿cant e￿ect, and the results did not di￿er when either one were removed from the
models (not shown, available upon request).
Finally, in models 5b - 8b, we replicated models 5a to 8a with controls for sample
selection. Therefore, we re-estimated the models from tables 2 in a probit equation
(not shown, available upon request), stored the estimates as Inverse Mill’s Ratios and
included them in our models from tables 5. Although none of the Inverse Mill’s Ratio
coe￿cients in table 2 was signi￿cant, controlling for them a￿ected the z-statistics of pep.
Thus, to achieve more conservative estimates in the second-stage selection equation, we
also controlled for the Inverse Mill’s ratios from the ￿rst-stage selection equation.
Note that in table 3, each model 5b-8b is associated its own IMR1a - IMR4a. The
results show that although the IMR scores themselves are not signi￿cant, they are able
to cancel out the signi￿cant e￿ects of both B and psd as well as those of the three
residuals from models 5a ￿ 8a. Hence, while in the case of the prediction of students’
probability of educational success only one ’conventional’ SEU predictors su￿ered from
sample selection bias, if students’ propensity of university transitions is controlled for the
selectivity of the subsample, also the estimates of teachers’ over- and under-estimations
lack statistical signi￿cance.21
4.3 Sensitivity Analyses
One objection that could be made against the antecedent Heckit models (and, likewise,
also against the models of Becker 2003) addresses the predictors in the selection equa-
tions. Particularly in the second-step selection equation (passing Abitur), the Inverse
Mill’s Ratios that had been stored from the ￿rst step might not su￿ce the exclusion re-
striction (for a similar line of arguing cf. J￿rges and Schneider, 2006) for the third-step
equation of interest (transition to university): Recall that in the third step, parental
social class is again introduced as a covariate in the logit equation - while it had already
been used as an instrument to identify the selection equation in the ￿rst step. Hence,
20Lucas (2001) suggests to rely on predicted probabilities rather than on regression coe￿cients when
comparing changes of social background e￿ects in the educational life course. Table D (Appendix)
indicates that the above trend also holds for the predicted probabilities of high school graduations
and university transitions, respectively (see corrected model).
21Since the number of observations for the two model sets with and without sample selection equation
are not equal, we repeated the analyses for models 5a-8a without the observations who did not have
a valid value for the Inverse Mill’s Ratios. The results of the self-ful￿lling prophecy residuals are
robust against these modi￿cations (not shown, available upon request).
26the problem might arise that the third-step equation of interest might not be identi￿ed
because it includes a variable that also a￿ects our instrument, i.e. the IMR control terms
in the second-step selection equation.
A strategy for situations where issues like selection and unobserved heterogeneity
might arise but good instruments are not available 22 has been proposed by Buis (2010).
The basic idea of his proposition is that unobserved variables that might a￿ect both the
main independent variable and the dependent variables over several transition points
are captured by a weighted sum of random variables  = z which are approximated by
a normal distribution. To re￿ect a variety of scenarios as regards the distribution of this
random variable, di￿erent values for the standard deviation of  are assumed. If sd() =
0, the assumption of unobserved heterogeneity is completely discarded ￿ which is the
standard case in conventional OLS (or logit/probit) regressions. The higher the standard
deviation of , the stronger the e￿ect that is allowed for unobserved heterogeneity. In
our case, we will examine how the e￿ects of all of our self-ful￿lling prophecy residuals
change with sd() = 0;sd() = 0:5;sd() = 1, and sd() = 2, respectively.
In more formal terms, the two-step Heckit estimations of section 4.2 are amended by
a sequential logit model where the probability of university transitions is conditional
on the subsample of those who have passed Abitur (for all the following see Buis 2010,
chapter 7):
p1i =
exp(1 + 1SEU + 1SFP)




exp(2 + 2SEU + 2SFP)
1 + exp(2 + 2SEU + 2SFP)
if pass1i = 1 (15)
Let (u) =
exp(u)
1+exp(u) capture the general functional form of the sequential logit model.
If now the weighted sum of unobserved covariates, , is introduced, the expected proba-
bilities of passing the two transitions averaged over  read:
E(Pr[y 2 fB;Cgjx;]) = E((01 + 11 + z)) (16)
E(Pr[y 2 fB;Cgjx;]) = E((02 + 12 + z |{z}

)) (17)
In a second step, we can also relax the restriction that this unobserved covariate is
not a confounding variable ￿ meaning that it is not correlated with our main predictor
of interest, i.e. the self-ful￿lling prophecy residuals. Just as we can approximate the
potential impact of the unobserved covariate on the outcome by assuming di￿erent values
for the standard deviation of the random variable, we can also approximate the potential
22While educational economists have proposed instruments like students’ birth quarter (Angrist and
Krueger, 1991) or distance to university (Card, 2001) to control for unobserved heterogeneity when
measuring the returns of education, we believe that for our hypothesized e￿ect of teachers’ expecta-
tions on students’ educational opportunities, it is uneven more challenging to ￿nd a good instrument
that does a￿ect the former but not the latter due to the logic of a self-ful￿lling prophecy.
27impact of the unobserved covariate on the self-ful￿lling prophecy residuals by assuming
di￿erent values for the correlation  between the two variables.
We think that by this technique we not only control for selectivity issues that may
arise in a sequence of educational transitions, but also tackle the objection of ’private
information’ that may be part of the teachers’ evaluation heuristic without being re-
￿ected in our self-ful￿lling prophecy residuals. Since the scenarios that are simulated
for the weighted sum of unobserved covariates ￿control￿ for a possible correlation with
a speci￿ed independent variable, too, it is also possible to get an intuition about the
direction that this private information may take.
To estimate these models, we would have to integrate over the distributions of z(= )
￿ which requires numerical approximation using maximum simulated likelihood (Train,
2003) since there are no closed form solutions for the respective integrals (Buis, 2010).
Luckily, this procedure has already been implemented in the seqlogit package (Buis,
2007) in Stata (StataCorp, 2009).
Figure 7 presents the sensitivity analyses for all three self-ful￿lling prophecy residuals
at both transition points. Each point on each single line represents a separate equation.
For instance, the vertical axis of the line plot on the upper left show the parameter esti-
mates and their 95% con￿dence intervals of the three residuals for students’ probability
on passing Abitur for the case that the correlation between the unobserved covariate and
each residual would be zero. On the horizontal axis, however, these estimates are plot-
ted against di￿erent assumed values for the standard deviation of the random variable
that should approximate the unobservables, namely sd = 0 (the case of no unobserved
covariate), sd = 0:5, sd = 1, and sd = 2. In the other three plots in the ￿rst line of the
graph, the restriction of no correlation between the unobservable and the residuals is
subsequently relaxed unto a correlation of  = 0:5. In the plots in the second line of the
graph, this procedure is repeated for the estimates (and their 95% con￿dence intervals)
of students’ propensity of university transitions ￿ conditional on having achieved Abitur
before. Hence, the plots in ￿gure 7 are based on 3 * 4 * 4 * 2 = 96 equations in total:
three for each residual, four for each standard deviation, four for each value of , and
two for each transition point. 23 If we start with the ￿rst set of equations predicting stu-
dents’ probability of passing Abitur, we see that in case of a zero or low (0.1) correlation
between the unobservables and the residuals, an unobservable that a￿ects the outcome
might lead to an increase in the coe￿cients of the self-ful￿lling prophecy residuals. Only
if both the impact of the unobservable on the outcome and its correlation with the resid-
uals are relatively strong, it might lower the estimates of the latter and likewise decrease
their signi￿cance.
The same tendency holds for the parameter estimates for students propensity of uni-
versity transitions. Just like in the selection model of table 8, the results lack statistical
signi￿cance for the case of  = 0 and = 0. If the correlation between  and the resid-
uals is not too large, an increase in its standard deviation could be associated with an
increase in the parameter estimates which may shift their con￿dence intervals above or
23The coe￿cients and z-statistics of the variables of interest for these equations are listed in tables E
(Abitur) and F (university transitions) in the appendix.
28next to the 95% signi￿cance level. However, if both the impact of the unobservable on
the outcome and its correlation with the residuals are relatively strong again, it might
lead to a decrease of both the estimates and their signi￿cance levels again. However, in
that case the model would surely su￿er from multicollinearity which would hinder an
unambigous interpretation (Farrar and Glauber, 1967).
29Figure 7: Sensitivity Analyses of Self-Ful￿lling Prophecy Residuals
3
0In sum, we can conclude that the prerequisites for an unobserved variable to weaken
the estimates and/or signi￿cance levels of the self-ful￿lling prophecy residuals have to be
relatively strong. Neither the strength of its impact on the outcome nor its correlation
with the variables of interest is a su￿cient condition for decreasing the predictive power
of the latter. Only if both conditions hold unto a relatively large extend, the results
would not be robust. Since we would expect this to be an issue of multicollinearity, we
do not consider the latter phenomenon to thwart our main ￿ndings.
5 Conclusion
The objective of this paper was to provide both theoretical and empirical evidence for
the distinct e￿ect of self-ful￿lling prophecies apart from the conventional subjective-
expected-utility (SEU) model of inequality in educational opportunities (IEO). Our aim
was ￿rst to develop a formal model, and second to test this model to predict students’
probability to graduate from high school ( Abitur) as well as their subsequent university
transitions.
In the theoretical section, we ￿rst summarized the basic assumptions of the SEU-IEO
models by Breen and Goldthorpe (1997) and Esser (1999). After a literature review of
Pygmalion and self-ful￿lling prophecy research (Rosenthal and Jacobson, 1968; Madon
et al., 1997; Jussim and Harber, 2005), we brought the argument that its main ￿nding, i.e.
that teachers’ expectations may in￿uence students’ academic performance, requires an
extension of the present SEU-IEO model. Consequently, an integration of self-ful￿lling
prophecies in the formal SEU-IEO model by Esser (1999) was developed.
Methodologically, self-ful￿lling prophecies were operationalized as the residuals of a
regression of a speci￿c form of teachers’ evaluations on a performative and a motivational
set of variables (also see Madon et al., 1997). However, in the empirical section it
turned out that the performance model was able to predict teachers’ evaluations more
satisfactory than the motivation model.
In our multivariate analyses that were based on the ￿K￿lner Gymnasiasten-Panel￿,
we found that the predictive power of the conventional SEU-IEO model is by average
weaker than in previous studies (e.g. Becker, 2003; Becker and Hecken, 2009) ￿ which
could be a corroboration of the life-course hypothesis (Mare, 1980, 1993) that indicates
that the e￿ects of social inequality decrease during students’ educational career.
In contrast, at least in the baseline model, the self-ful￿lling prophecy residuals were
able to predict both students’ educational success in terms of passing Abitur and their
university transitions signi￿cantly. Thus, the tentative conclusion from these models
would be that self-ful￿lling prophecies have indeed distinct e￿ects besides the conven-
tional SEU predictors. Moreover, since the e￿ect sizes of the residuals are lower for
students’ university transitions than for their educational success, this could be another
demonstration of life course e￿ects.
Because of the selectivity problem concerning the dependency of students’ resources
and preferences by social class and their conditional transition decisions, we replicated
all models with corrections for sample selection bias (Heckman, 1979). It turned out that
31in case of the prediction of students’ educational success the results remain stable, while
in case of the prediction of their university transitions all self-ful￿lling prophecy residuals
lost their signi￿cance. This indicates that there is little evidence that the e￿cacy of self-
ful￿lling prophecies could mainly be explained by students’ social class. Notwithstanding
this particular stability, there is no reason to assume that self-ful￿lling prophecies might
a￿ect students’ propensity of university transitions conditional on having passed Abitur .
This suggests that the e￿ect of teachers’ expectations is limited on students’ school
success and does not in￿uence their decision for or against starting academic studies.
Because of some methodological objections that could be made against the quality of
the instruments in the selection models, and to tackle the argument that teachers might
have private information at their disposal which is not captured by the variables in the
three residual models, a sensitivity analysis was performed. In particular, we additionally
allowed for unobserved heterogeneity which was approximated by a random variable that
could take di￿erent values on both its standard deviations and its correlation with the
self-ful￿lling prophecy residuals. It turned out that only if relatively high values on
both parameters are allowed simultaneously, the residual estimates might not be robust.
However, since this would go in line with the problem of multicollinearity, we do not
expect our main ￿ndings to be challenged by this issue.
Nonetheless, further analyses should consider additional variables. Remember that
one major theoretical shortcoming of Pygmalion concerns an insu￿cient consideration
of moderators such as students’ grade level or teachers’ duration in class. Thus, future
studies should also include potential covariates beyond the standard SEU predictors to
ensure a better understanding of the social mechanism behind the e￿cacy of self-ful￿lling
prophecies ￿ particularly, if the empirical model par se is, as in the case of our data
at hand, only an approximation of the theoretical or substantive model. Considering
both teacher- and student-level variables would require to estimate a cross-classi￿ed
hierarchical model (Snijders and Bosker, 1999; Hox, 2002) wherein teachers’ evaluations
as the lowest unit are nested in both teacher and student contexts. To be sure, this
might also necessitate a re￿ned operationalization of self-ful￿lling prophecies.
References
Allison PD (2002) Missing Data. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Amthauer R (1957) Intelligenz-Struktur-Test. G￿ttingen: Hogrefe.
Angrist JD and Krueger AB (1991) Does compulsory school attendance a￿ect schooling
and earnings? The Quarterly Journal of Economics 106(4): 979￿1014.
Ashenfelter O; Harmon C and Oosterbeek H (1999) A review of estimates of the school-
ing/earnings relationship, with tests for publication bias. Labour economics 6(4):
453￿470.
Becker R (2000) Klassenlage und Bildungsentscheidungen - Eine empirische Anwendung
der Wert-Erwartungstheorie. Zeitschrift f￿r Soziologie 52(3): 450￿474.
32Becker R (2003) Educational Expansion and Persistent Inequalities of Education. Eu-
ropean Sociological Review 19(1): 1￿24.
Becker R and Hecken AE (2008) Why are Working-class Children Diverted from
Universities?￿An Empirical Assessment of the Diversion Thesis. European Sociological
Review 25(2): 233￿250.
Becker R and Hecken AE (2009) Higher Education or Vocational Training?: An Em-
pirical Test of the Rational Action Model of Educational Choices Suggested by Breen
and Goldthorpe and Esser. Acta Sociologica 52(1): 25￿45.
Bishop JH (1989) Is the test score decline responsible for the productivity growth decline?
The American Economic Review 79(1): 178￿197.
Blossfeld HP and Shavit Y (1993) Persisting Barriers, 1￿23. Boulder, CO: Westview
Press.
Boissiere M; Knight JB and Sabot RH (1985) Earnings, schooling, ability, and cognitive
skills. The American Economic Review 75(5): 1016￿1030.
Boudon R (1974) Education, Opportunity and Social Inequality: Changing Prospects in
Western Society. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
Brattesani KA; Weinstein RS and Marshall HH (1984) Student Perceptions of Di￿er-
ential Teacher Treatment as Moderators of Teacher Expectation E￿ects. Journal of
Educational Psychology 76(2): 236￿247.
Breen R and Goldthorpe JH (1997) Explaining educational di￿erentials: Towards a
formal rational action theory. Rationality and Society 9(3): 275￿305.
Breen R and Jonsson JO (2000) Analyzing educational careers: A multinomial transition
model. American Sociological Review 754￿772.
Buis ML (2007) SEQLOGIT: Stata module to ￿t a sequential logit model.
URL: http://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s456843.html
Buis ML (2010) Inequality of Educational Outcome and Inequality of Educational Op-
portunity in the Netherlands during the 20th Century. Disseration thesis, Vrije Uni-
versiteit Amsterdam.
Card D (2001) Estimating the return to schooling: Progress on some persistent econo-
metric problems. Econometrica 69(5): 1127￿1160.
Cohen J; Cohen P; West SG et al. (2003) Applied Multiple Regression / Correlation
Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences . Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Cox DR (1990) Role of models in statistical analysis. Statistical Science 5(3): 169￿174.
33Cunha F and Heckman JJ (2007) Identifying and estimating the distributions of ex post
and ex ante returns to schooling. Labour Economics 14(6): 870￿893.
Cunha F; Heckman JJ and Navarro S (2005) Separating uncertainty from heterogeneity
in life cycle earnings. Oxford Economic Papers 57(2): 191￿261.
Elasho￿ JD and Snow RE (1971) Pygmalion reconsidered: : A case study in statisti-
cal inference: Reconsideration of the Rosenthal-Jacobson data on teacher expectancy .
Worthington, Ohio: CA Jones Pub. Co.
Esser H (1999) Soziologie. Spezielle Grundlagen 1. Situationslogik und Handeln. Frank-
furt / New York: Campus Verlag.
Farrar DE and Glauber RR (1967) Multicollinearity in regression analysis: The problem
revisited. The Review of Economic and Statistics 49(1): 92￿107.
Gelman A and Hill J (2007) Data Analysis Using Regression and Multilevel/Hierarchical
Models. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Goldthorpe JH (1996) Class analysis and the reorientation of class theory: the case of
persisting di￿erentials in educational attainment. British Journal of Sociology 47(3):
481￿505.
Goldthorpe JH (2001) Causation, statistics, and sociology. European Sociological Review
17(1): 1￿20.
Greene WH (2003) Econometric analysis. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Hanushek EA and Kimko DD (2000) Schooling, labor-force quality, and the growth of
nations. The American Economic Review 90(5): 1184￿1208.
Heckman JJ (1979) Sample selection bias as a speci￿cation error. Econometrica: Journal
of the econometric society 47(1): 153￿161.
Hillmert S and Jacob M (2010) Selections and social selectivity on the academic track:
A life-course analysis of educational attainment in Germany. Research in Social Strat-
i￿cation and Mobility 28(1): 59￿76.
Hox JJ (2002) Multilevel analysis: Techniques and applications . Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence
Erlbaum.
Jensen AR (1969) How much can we boost IQ and scholastic achievement. Harvard
Educational Review 39(1): 1￿123.
Jonsson JO (1999) Explaining Sex Di￿erences in Educational Choice An Empirical As-
sessment of a Rational Choice Model. European Sociological Review 15(4): 391￿404.
34J￿rges H and Schneider K (2006) Age at school entry and teacher’s recommendations
for secondary school track choice in Germany. In: Paper presented at the 20th annual
ESPE conference, Verona.
Jussim L; Eccles J and Madon SJ (1996) Social perception, social stereotypes, and teacher
expectations: Accuracy and the quest for the powerful self-ful￿lling prophecy , vol. 28,
281￿388. San Diego: Academic Press.
Jussim L and Harber KD (2005) Teacher Expectations and Self-Ful￿lling Prophecies:
Knowns and Unknowns, Resolved and Unresolved Controversies. Personality and
Social Psychology Review 9(2): 131￿155.
Lauen DL (2007) Contextual Explanations of School Choice. Sociology of Education
80(3): 179￿209.
Lucas SR (2001) E￿ectively Maintained Inequality: Education Transitions, Track Mobil-
ity, and Social Background E￿ects. American Journal of Sociology 106(6): 1642￿1690.
Madon S; Jussim L and Eccles J (1997) In Search of the Powerful Self-Ful￿lling Prophecy.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 72(4): 791￿809.
Madon S; Jussim L; Keiper S et al. (1998) The accuracy and power of sex, social class,
and ethnic stereotypes: A naturalistic study in person perception. Personality and
Social Psychology Bulletin 24(12): 1304￿1318.
Mare RD (1980) Social Background and School Continuation Decisions. Journal of the
American Statistical Association 75(370): 295￿ 305.
Mare RD (1993) Educational strati￿cation on observed and unobserved components of
family background, 351￿376. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Merton RK (1948) The self-ful￿lling prophecy. Antioch Review 8(2): 193￿210.
M￿ller-Benedict V (2007) Wodurch kann die soziale Ungleichheit des Schulerfolgs am
st￿rksten verringert werden? KZfSS K￿lner Zeitschrift f￿r Soziologie und Sozialpsy-
chologie 59(4): 615￿639.
Need A and De Jong U (2001) Educational di￿erentials in the Netherlands. Rationality
and Society 13(1): 71￿98.
Pietsch M and Stubbe TC (2007) Inequality in the transition from primary to secondary
school: School choices and educational disparities in Germany. European Educational
Research Journal 6(4): 424￿445.
Raudenbush SW (1984) Magnitude of Teacher Expectancy E￿ects on Pupil IQ as a
Function of the Credibility of Expectancy Induction: A Synthesis of Findings From
18 Experiments. Journal of Educational Psychology 76(1): 85￿97.
35Raudenbush SW (1994) Random e￿ects models, 301￿321. New York: Sage.
Rogosa D (1987) Casual models do not support scienti￿c conclusions: A comment in
support of Freedman. Journal of Educational Statistics 12(2): 185￿195.
Rosenthal R and Jacobson L (1968) Pygmalion in the Classroom: Teacher Expectation
and Pupils’ Intellectual Development . New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.
Rosenthal R and Rubin DB (1978) Interpersonal expectancy e￿ects: The ￿rst 345 stud-
ies. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1(3): 377￿415.
Roth BM (1995) We can throw teacher expactations on the IQ scrap heap. New York
Times.
Schelsky H (1957) Schule und Erziehung in der industriellen Gesellschaft . W￿rzburg:
Werkbund Verlag.
Schneider T (2008) Social Inequality in Educational Participation in the German School
System in a Longitudinal Perspective: Pathways into and out of the most Prestigious
School Track. European Sociological Review 24(4): 511￿526.
Smith ML (1980) Meta-analysis of research in teacher expectation. Evaluation in Edu-
cation 4: 53￿56.
Snijders TAB and Bosker RJ (1999) Multilevel analysis: An introduction to basic and
advanced multilevel modeling . London: Sage Publications Ltd.
Snow RE (1969) Un￿nished pygmalion. Contemporary Psychology 14(4): 197￿199.
Sł rensen AB (1998) Theoretical mechanisms and the empirical study of social processes ,
238￿266. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
StataCorp (2009) Stata Statistical Software: Release 11 . College Station, TX: StataCorp
LP.
StockØ V (2007) Explaining Educational Decision and E￿ects of Families’ Social Class
Position: An Empirical Test of the Breen Goldthorpe Model of Educational Attain-
ment. European Sociological Review 23(4): 505￿519.
Thorndike RL (1968) Review of Pygmalion in the classroom. American Educational
Research Journal 5(4): 708￿711.
Train KA (2003) Discrete choice methods with simulation . Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
Wineburg SS (1987) The Self-Ful￿llment of the Self-Ful￿lling Prophecy. Educational
Researcher 16(9): 28￿37.
Wooldridge J (2006) Introductory Econometrics. Cincinnati, Ohio: South-Western Col-
lege Publ.
366 Appendix
Table A: Descriptive Results
(1)
count mean sd min max
time of high school graduation 1415 81.90 14.66 46.00 228.00
graduation on ￿rst try 1987 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00
time of university transition 1987 154.57 108.17 44.00 367.00
university transition within 3 years after graduation 1987 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00
teacher evaluation (dichotomized) 1367 0.55 0.50 0.00 1.00
intelligence 3230 110.45 11.35 76.00 151.00
average grade 3227 499.98 69.22 221.00 703.00
motivation 3224 5.71 2.08 1.00 11.00
self-concept 3208 6.65 1.91 1.00 11.00
self-con￿dence 3213 8.13 1.51 1.00 11.00
residuals (performance model) 1309 0.00 0.38 -0.99 0.99
residuals (motivarion model) 1294 0.01 0.44 -0.91 0.95
residuals (full model) 1287 0.00 0.38 -1.20 1.05
residuals (performance model, dichotomized) 1309 0.55 0.50 0.00 1.00
residuals (motivarion model, dichotomized) 1294 0.56 0.50 0.00 1.00
residuals (full model, dichotomized) 1287 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00
B 3225 0.69 0.46 0.00 1.00
-SD 2355 0.41 0.49 0.00 1.00
Psd 2674 0.37 0.48 0.00 1.00
Pep 2695 0.95 0.23 0.00 1.00
C 2695 0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00
parental social class 2687 49.37 12.63 18.00 78.00
parental educational attainment 3374 2.14 1.23 1.00 4.00
educational motivation 2290 0.80 0.40 0.00 1.00
investment risk 2691 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00
IMR_sum 926 4.22 0.45 3.44 5.33
IMR_perf_di 1070 0.69 0.10 0.47 0.94
IMR_mot_di 1058 0.68 0.10 0.47 0.92
IMR_full_di 1054 0.82 0.09 0.63 1.04
IMR_1a 1419 0.62 0.16 0.46 1.53
IMR_2a 585 0.62 0.44 0.24 1.79
IMR_3a 582 0.62 0.43 0.24 1.80
IMR_4a 580 0.60 0.32 0.24 1.82
IMR_1b 579 0.60 0.26 0.32 1.91
IMR_2b 579 0.62 0.43 0.21 1.81
IMR_3b 579 0.62 0.43 0.21 1.81
IMR_4b 579 0.60 0.32 0.22 1.89
IMR_1c 1419 0.61 0.06 0.58 0.75
IMR_2c 585 0.61 0.41 0.29 1.30
IMR_3c 582 0.61 0.40 0.29 1.30
IMR_4c 580 0.59 0.25 0.33 1.05
IMR_1d 579 0.59 0.12 0.40 0.94
IMR_2d 579 0.61 0.41 0.24 1.39
IMR_3d 579 0.61 0.41 0.24 1.39







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































40Table E: A Sensitivity Analysis for Self-Ful￿lling Prophecy Residuals (Transition:
Abitur)
performance model motivation model full model
rho0sd0a
b 2.184151 2.131192 1.195157
z 10.32542 10.10805 6.190385
rho0sd5a
b 2.300063 2.243347 1.253663
z 10.3838 10.15775 6.189155
rho0sd10a
b 2.604713 2.538721 1.409969
z 10.47301 10.23553 6.186296
rho0sd20a
b 3.520772 3.429911 1.890575
z 10.5664 10.31637 6.179325
rho1sd0a
b 2.184151 2.131192 1.195157
z 10.32542 10.10805 6.190385
rho1sd5a
b 2.194397 2.137723 1.153021
z 9.911121 9.683768 5.694879
rho1sd10a
b 2.391868 2.326 1.207879
z 9.63034 9.390714 5.30694
rho1sd20a
b 3.092165 3.001605 1.484773
z 9.307114 9.054466 4.867169
rho3sd0a
b 2.184151 2.131192 1.195157
z 10.32542 10.10805 6.190385
rho3sd5a
b 1.976348 1.919971 .9483301
z 8.95787 8.728262 4.70098
rho3sd10a
b 1.943463 1.878511 .7919539
z 7.912032 7.66861 3.518721
rho3sd20a
b 2.171271 2.082975 .6395354
z 6.693621 6.435879 2.147459
rho5sd0a
b 2.184151 2.131192 1.195157
z 10.32542 10.10805 6.190385
rho5sd5a
41performance model motivation model full model
b 1.749196 1.693402 .7390304
z 7.985123 7.753716 3.690597
rho5sd10a
b 1.463371 1.400289 .3597174
z 6.096067 5.84949 1.635921
rho5sd20a
b 1.158377 1.074779 -.2541716
z 3.761082 3.497863 -.8991183
Table F: A Sensitivity Analysis for Self-Ful￿lling Prophecy Residuals (Transition:
University)
performance model motivation model full model
rho0sd0b
b .231838 .1909521 -.0108028
z .4816385 .3980592 -.0283692
rho0sd5b
b .3499028 .3060727 .0476244
z .7094946 .6228028 .1221588
rho0sd10b
b .6600259 .6073403 .2016426
z 1.254707 1.15886 .4853785
rho0sd20b
b 1.593731 1.511577 .6637602
z 2.577975 2.454781 1.351818
rho1sd0b
b .231838 .1909521 -.0108028
z .4816385 .3980592 -.0283692
rho1sd5b
b .2442164 .2004237 -.053016
z .4953126 .4079225 -.1360199
rho1sd10b
b .4471103 .3945533 -.0004007
z .8506118 .7534233 -.0009652
rho1sd20b
b 1.164963 1.083175 .2582188
z 1.887321 1.761783 .526771
rho3sd0b
b .231838 .1909521 -.0108028
z .4816385 .3980592 -.0283692
rho3sd5b
b .0260053 -.0175311 -.2576976
z .0528434 -.0357488 -.6623826
42performance model motivation model full model
rho3sd10b
b -.0018588 -.053469 -.4159646
z -.0035585 -.1027417 -1.008306
rho3sd20b
b .24269 .1637122 -.5849299
z .3982183 .2696962 -1.20981
rho5sd0b
b .231838 .1909521 -.0108028
z .4816385 .3980592 -.0283692
rho5sd5b
b -.2014799 -.2445182 -.4669888
z -.410981 -.5005141 -1.204813
rho5sd10b
b -.483083 -.5328065 -.847538
z -.9369038 -1.037127 -2.081037
rho5sd20b
b -.7734081 -.8465689 -1.474437
z -1.304974 -1.434111 -3.141754
43